FIRST PERSON PLURAL
Jim Chen*

One is the loneliest number you will ever do, but we is the loneliest word in
1

American law. Let me explain.
From its founding documents to the pronouncements of the contemporary
Supreme Court, the legal system of the United States of America routinely speaks in
first person plural. We hold these truths to be self-evident . . . . We the people of the

United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic
tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure
the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of America. When speaking ex cathedra, this
honorable Court speaks as we. The appearance of the first personal singular – I, me,
my – is the surest sign of defeat among the Justices. In my country, ’tis of thee, we
beats me.
But the very nature of the English language conceals how isolating the use of
first person plural in law can be. Many languages draw sharp distinctions not known in
English. Number in English, limited to singular and plural, includes dual or even trial
forms in other languages. An even more striking difference arises from the treatment
of first person pronouns and verbs. A significant number of languages distinguish
between the inclusive and exclusive forms of the first person plural (and of first person
dual and trial, to the extent numbers beyond singular and plural exist in those
languages). A more formal articulation of the inclusive/exclusive distinction follows:
First person inclusive includes the speaker and may or may not include
a non-speech act participant. Some languages have an “inclusive dual”
form, even though dual may not be specified in any other part of the
grammar. This form refers only to speaker and hearer and excludes a
non-speech act participant. First person exclusive includes the speaker
and a non-speech act participant, but excludes the hearer. 2
Another way of conceptualizing the inclusive/exclusive distinction hinges on
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defining first person plural as a first-and-second person combination or as a first-andthird person combination. In any language, first person plural (or dual) necessarily
requires the speaker to refer to at least one other person besides herself. At an
absolute minimum, in a language in which plural number begins with two rather than
three (or even four, in those rare languages that contain trial number), first person
plural combines the speaker (first person singular) with either second person singular
or third person singular. In other words:
* First person singular plus second person = inclusive first person plural
* First person singular plus third person only = exclusive first person plural
In a language lacking dual number, the inclusive first person plural may include at least
one other individual besides the addressee. But the exclusive first person plural (or
dual or trial) necessarily excludes the addressee.3
English draws no distinction between the inclusive and exclusive forms of the
first person plural. With a single exception, the Marathi language of western India,
no Indo-European language draws that distinction. English we, German wir,
Swedish vi, Icelandic við, French nous, Spanish nosotros, and Italian noi can either
include or exclude the listener.
Outside the Indo-European world, however, the inclusive/exclusive
distinction abounds. At least one non-Indo-European language that developed
under the strong influence of English as a superstrate langauge contains inclusive
and exclusive expressions of first person plural.4 Tok Pisin, an official language of
Papau New Guinea, leverages the syntax of Melanesian languages to transform the
English words you, me, and fellow into distinct inclusive (yumi – an amalgam of you
and me) and exclusive (mifela – an amalgam of me and fellow) forms of the firstperson plural pronoun. Tok Pisin’s morphological similarity to English creates an
informal mnemonic by which native speakers of English can remember the
otherwise exotic phenomenon of inclusive and exclusive first person plural
pronouns: yumi designates inclusive first person, while mifela designates exclusive
first person. In the woeful but workable tradition of travel guide phonology, youme and me-fellow will do.
The broader family of Austronesian languages (which includes Melanesian
languages) exhibits the inclusive-exclusive distinction on a nearly universal basis.
Malay and Indonesian distinguish between the inclusive pronoun kita and the
3
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exclusive pronoun kami. By saying “We (kami) will go shopping, and then we
(kita) will eat,” a host can clearly communicate that his guest should not accompany
him to the market, but that the guest is invited to dinner. Likewise, Tagalog boasts
kamí and táyo as its exclusive and inclusive forms of the first person plural.
The Samoan language, another member of the Austronesian family,
displays an intriguing variation on this theme.5 Like Malay and Tagalog, Samoan
has two separate roots for we: inclusive ’ita and exclusive ’ima. Samoan then
combines those roots with the dual suffix -’ua or the plural suffix -tou to form a full
complement of dual and plural pronouns meaning we, you all, and they:

Samoan pronouns
First person
Emotional
Inclusive
Exclusive
Second person
Third person

Singular
a’u
’ita

’oe
ia

Dual

Plural

’ita’ua
’ima’ua
’oulua
’ila’ua

’itatou
’matou
’outou
’ilatou

The inclusive pronoun ’ita may be used on its own as a singular pronoun. ’Ita
means I, but in a sense that implicitly asks the listener’s indulgence for the speaker’s
emotional involvement in the subject. By using ’ita instead of a’u, a Samoan
speaker effectively involves her addressee in statements about herself.
The Sino-Tibetan language family also plays with the inclusive/exclusive
distinction, albeit inconsistently. Standard Mandarin uses the pronoun wǒmen
我們 (we), the plural of the pronoun wǒ 我 (I), in an indefinite fashion comparable
to the way English speakers use we. Northern dialects of Mandarin, however,
adopt an additional pronoun, zámen 咱們, which is inclusive, and retains wǒmen
我們 to denote we in its exclusive sense. Taiwanese accomplishes a similar feat by
manipulating the enclitic –n, which indicates plural number in pronouns. The
exclusive pronoun goán is the plural of goá (I), whereas the inclusive pronoun lán
combines the plural suffix –n with a root influenced by lí (you). For a native
speaker of Taiwanese who hopes to be included within a conversational strand,
goán is the loneliest pronoun.
Most modern Dravidian languages (except Kannada) retain the
See ULRIKE MOSEL & EVEN HOVDHAUGEN, SAMOAN REFERENCE GRAMMAR 121 (1992); see also
PAYNE, supra note 2, at 45.
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inclusive/exclusive distinction, a trait traceable to in proto-Dravidian. For instance,
in Malayalam, നമ്മള് (nammaḷ) denotes the inclusive form of we; ഞങ്ങള്
(ñaṅṅaḷ) represents the exclusive form. In Tamil, the forms are inclusive nām and
exclusive nāṅkaḷ.6 University of Oklahoma law professor Srividhya Ragavan, a
native speaker of Tamil, reports the following forms within her dialect:

Nan
Nambo
Nango
Ni
Ningo

=
=
=
=
=

I (first person singular)
you and I (inclusive first person plural)
other(s) and I (exclusive first person plural)
you (second person singular)
you (second person plural or polite)

This remarkable sequence sheds light on the morphology, sociolinguistics, and
phonology of Professor Ragavan’s dialect. The enclitic –go designates a plural,
much as –n does in Taiwanese. Exclusive first person plural nango is merely the
plural form of singular nan, while ningo represents the plural form of the singular
second person pronoun, ni. As with French vous or Swedish ni,7 the second
person plural does extra duty as the polite form. Finally, Tamil nan becomes namunder the phonetic influence of the suffix –bo. The alveolar /n/ sound invariably
becomes the labial /m/ in the presence of the voiced stop /g/. For comparison’s
sake, the Japanese loanword ハーンバガ must be pronounced haambaga rather
than haanbaga, even though the katakana character ン ordinarily designates the
phoneme n. 8
The Cherokee language, rightly renowned as the only Amerind language
with its own writing system and the only language anywhere whose writing system is
the work of a single individual,9 also boasts a highly elaborate and expressive set of
pronouns. Linguist Steven Pinker admires how “the complex Cherokee pronoun
system” provides distinct forms for “‘you and I,’ ‘another person and I,’ ‘several other
people and I,’ and ‘you, one or more other persons and I,’ which English crudely
collapses into the all-purpose pronoun we.”10 Like Samoan, Cherokee not only
6
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contains three numbers – singular, dual, and plural – but also distinguishes between the
inclusive and exclusive forms of the first person dual and plural.
Within North America, Cherokee is hardly alone in distinguishing between
exclusive and inclusive first person plural. (Cherokee is lonely in the sense that it is
the last extant Southern Iroquoian language.) All Algonquian languages draw this
distinction. In Shawnee, for instance, the exclusive first person plural pronoun is
niilawe, and the inclusive first person plural pronoun is kiilawe, by obvious analogy
to the first person singular pronoun niila and the second person singular pronoun
kiila. All Algonquian languages also draw the inclusive/exclusive distinction in the
pronominal inflection of their verbs. Although use or nonuse of the distinction
follows no discernible pattern in New World languages, distinct pronouns
indicating inclusive versus exclusive first person plural appear in South American
languages such as Quecha and Guaraní.
From Austronesia to the Andes, many of the languages of the greater Pacific
rim take care to distinguish the inclusive from the exclusive use of the first person
plural. By contrast, nearly the entire Indo-European family, at least west of
Maharashtra (the heart of the Marathi-speaking population), pays no heed and
adopts undifferentiated first person plural pronouns. What light, if any, does this
global linguistic divide shed upon the project of legal interpretation, especially
constitutional interpretation, in a country that leads the world in absorbing
newcomers and in projecting its values – by force, by market power, or by sheer,
mere numbers – across the globe?
At an absolute minimum, in a constitutional system whose highest court has
exhibited increasing willingness to consult foreign precedent,11 the American
constitutional tradition has begun to transcend the relatively narrow cultural and
linguistic confines of the “English-speaking peoples.”12 Although the Supreme
See generally, e.g., David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L.
Rev. 539 (2001); Sarah K. Harding, Comparative Reasoning and Judicial Review, 28 YALE J. INT’L L.
409 (2003); Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119
HARV. L. REV. 109 (2005); Sanford Levinson, Looking Abroad When Interpreting the U.S.
Constitution: Some Reflections, 39 TEX. INT’L L.J. 353 (2004); Osmar J. Benvenuto, Note,
Reevaluating the Debate Surrounding the Supreme Court’s Use of Foreign Precedent, 74 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2695 (2006); Matthew S. Raalf, Note, A Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing: Why the Debate Surrounding
Comparative Constitutional Law Is Spectacularly Ordinary, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1239 (2004)..
12
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 (1947); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949); cf.
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 528 (1884) (“[A] process of law, which is not otherwise
forbidden, must be taken to be due process of law, if it can show the sanction of settled usage both
in England and in this country; but it by no means follows, that nothing else can be due process of
law.”).
11
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Court has never conclusively adjudicated the constitutionality of legislation
declaring English to be the official language of a state,13 Congress has (with the
Supreme Court’s apparent blessing), prohibited the states from treating proficiency
in English as a precondition to the franchise. 14 It also appears that failing to provide
adequate education to children whose native language is not English violates Title
VI, 15 even if federal law gives individual families no power to enforce this provision
through private lawsuits.16 The Supreme Court has recognized that a prosecutor’s
motivation “for excusing . . . jurors related to their ability to speak and understand
Spanish [might] raise a plausible, though not a necessary, inference that language
might be a pretext for what in fact were race-based peremptory challenges.” 17 And the
right to teach and learn languages other than English, sanctified as a substantive
expression of due process nearly a century ago, remains the law of the land.18
On the other hand, the United States has achieved a far more mixed legal
legacy among native speakers of languages that draw the inclusive/exclusive
distinction. In one of its first cases interpreting the nativist immigration laws of the
1920s, the Supreme Court held that persons of Japanese descent (and presumably
those originating from other east Asian countries) could not attain citizenship under
an immigration statute limiting naturalization to “free white persons” and “persons
of African nativity or descent.”19 The Court then extended that holding to persons
of Asian Indian descent.20 By contrast, with respect to the Philippines, the site of
one of the United States’ more regrettable colonial misadventures, the Supreme
Court did invalidate a territorial law that effectively prohibited the recording of
financial accounts in Chinese.21
Finally, the long and often unhappy interaction between American
constitutional law and the native peoples of North America has often contested the
13
14
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(reporting “overwhelming evidence” that showed “the ingenuity and prevalence of discriminatory
practices that have been used to dilute the voting strength and otherwise affect the voting rights of
language minorities”); New York v. United States, 419 U.S. 888, 888 (1974) (summarily affirming a
three-judge district court’s decision to invalidate an English-only election).
15
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
16
See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 285 (2001).
17
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See Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 409-11 (1923); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 396-403
(1923).
19
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degree to which the “the Courts of the conqueror” may and should stay the hand of
cultural extermination.22 At its best, the Supreme Court has “perceive[d] plainly
that the constitution . . . does not comprehend Indian tribes in the general term
‘foreign nations;’ not we presume, because a tribe may not be a nation, but because
it is not foreign to the United States.”23 It is safe to say that the long project of
“domesticating” Indian law – that of fully incorporating the United States’
obligations to native America into the Constitution and the American constitutional
tradition – remains a work in progress.24
In the meanwhile, the prevalence of the inclusive/exclusive distinction
among so many languages that have contributed to the linguistic and cultural mosaic
of the United States answers the lingering question: Whom does American
constitutional law address and include when its foundational documents and central
interpretive institution speak in the first person plural? When the Declaration of
Independence “hold[s] these truths to be self-evident,” it is amply clear that the we
of the Declaration’s second sentence excludes the intended audience – the great
European powers that might otherwise have intervened on behalf of the British
crown’s effort to retain its colonies in North America. The Supreme Court’s
ubiquitous we falls even more squarely on the exclusive side of the yumi/mifela
divide within first person plural.
The final – and by far the most important – piece of contested linguistic turf
is therefore the opening sentence, even the first word, of the Constitution itself.
Who exactly belongs within the phrase, We the People? Who constituted the
audience that the document’s framers intended to address? As a matter of original
intent, the idea of an inclusive We the People seems remote, and sadly so. On his
careful reading of the document as a whole and the early tradition that it inspired,
Justice Thurgood Marshall suggested that the Constitution’s framers intended no
such thing as comprehensive inclusion: “In their declaration of the principles that
were to provide the cornerstone of the new Nation, therefore, the Framers made it
plain that “we the people,” for whose protection the Constitution was designed, did
not include those whose skins were the wrong color.”25 But they are dead and we
22
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are not, and any constitutional tradition worth protecting is a living tradition.
What shall we Americans ultimately make of first person plural within this
nation’s constitutional tradition? Too doleful a sentiment scarcely befits a
constitutional tradition that increasingly tests itself by global standards. 26 Every
nation displays a tablet of its virtues (and its vices) through its fundamental law.
The United States is no exception. Within the American civic religion called
constitutional law,27 the possibility of ongoing change and eventual redemption
reigns supreme. Nothing lies beyond reform and salvation – nothing, that is, except
the past.28 To lament that “[t]he harvest is past, the summer is ended, and we are
not saved,” therefore seems downright un-American. 29 Indeed, that sentiment
befits an altogether different tradition, one dominated by a cavalcade of Thou
shalts30 – the very embodiment of the second person singular.

the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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